This blog will be focusing a good deal of attention on the Civil War for a while. As you can see below, we'll still have plenty to say about Sarah Palin, the NFL, Warcraft and black folks in general. But the Civil War is now an official obsession of mine.
To wit, I have several mini-thoughts I'd offer up from some of my latest readings. Some of these are questions, and some of them are observations. Civil War buffs, and non-Civil War buffs, are welcome to chime in.
--Was the Union really as poorly led as it seems? I've been doing a lot of reading about The Siege of Petersburg, and The Crater, in particular. Apparently, two of the generals in the fight, stayed behind the lines, drinking themselves silly, while Union soldiers were slaughtered.
--It's fascinating to think about my own expectations for black soldiers in the War. There's a temptation to search for a kind of blaxploitation figure who grabs a Gatling Gun and starts mowing down the Secesh. There are heroes everywhere. But there is also so much tragedy. It's really hard to read about Forrest. But you have to acknowledge that he was Scourge to black soldiers in Tennessee. And he got away with it. It's just true. I've been thinking about the Ving Rhames character in Rosewood. Black history as suffering is wrong. But so is black history as a revenge flick.
--One of my favorite quotes comes from Andre Cailloux, a hero of the Native Guard, one of the first black regiments put in the field. He dies heroically at Port Hudson. His soldiers, grieving over his death, hold a seance and summon his spirit. Calloux reaches back from the grave and tells his troops, "They thought they had killed me, but they made me live." They made me live. Such a great motto for the slave turned soldier.
--Speaking of quotes, I've come across some great ones. The great Confederate cavalryman, Jeb Stuart is pissed off that his father-in-law has sided with the Union. Just before facing him in battle, Stuart remarks upon his father-in-law, "He'll regret it but once," Stuart vows. "And that will be continuously."
--Here is a thorough meditation on Glory and Gods and Generals from National Review.
--I recently saw Glory again, by the way. I liked it. But it was really, really clean. I don't mean that the battle wasn't gory enough--some dude's head got blown off. But everyone seemed to be wearing makeup, and there was no real sense of how much disease affected people's lives. It's amazing to think people died of diarrhea in those days. I thought the film should have had a more macabre feel. Also the House Nigger vs. Field Nigger thing felt really 20th century.
The Beautiful Struggle: A Father, Two Sons, and an Unlikely Road to Manhood 
--Was the Union really as poorly led as it seems?
Actually, they both were just as poorly led. The difference was the Union was on the attack more often so they had more opportunity to showcase their poor leadership. Officers were for the most part not professionals. The regiments were raised locally and local prominent citizens were made the officers. And then they we expected to led their men by walking straight into fortified positions containing rifles and cannon. It was terrifying. For me the amazing thing is not that some men broke under the strain but that so many others did not break under the strain.
This point about offense/defense is a great one. This has actually been noted in some of my readings. I'd forgotten about it.
Lighthouse is on point. I'd just mention the additional factor of replacement policies within units -- it's a going argument that small unit (roughly battalion) combat effectiveness deteriorates when fresh soldiers are fed in.
The contrast between Union and Confederacy was pretty sharp on this issue: Confederate units very rarely took replacements, and quickly departed from book strength, while Union units tended to be kept much closer to book strength, with a corresponding influx of replacements. These Union units tended to become less and less effective as their original 'trained' identity was diluted.
As such, Confederate units tended to be able to do what their leaders asked of them for much longer -- which, not coincidentally, tended to make their leaders look good.
The 20th Maine seems to have been an interesting exception to the rule -- makes its name at Little Round Top, after serving on the front lines for a fairly long time. But looking at the unit history -- in comparison with its cohort of regiments -- it had the luck of avoiding heavy engagement during the year or so previous. Chamberlain, the 20th Maine's commander, was a sympathetic fellow, and clearly more than competent... but he was also lucky in that his regiment came to battle _both_ fresh and blooded. And so he _seems_ one of the bright lights of Union leadership.
"Lighthouse is on point. I'd just mention the additional factor of replacement policies within units -- it's a going argument that small unit (roughly battalion) combat effectiveness deteriorates when fresh soldiers are fed in.
"The contrast between Union and Confederacy was pretty sharp on this issue: Confederate units very rarely took replacements, and quickly departed from book strength, while Union units tended to be kept much closer to book strength, with a corresponding influx of replacements. These Union units tended to become less and less effective as their original 'trained' identity was diluted."
I will disagree about this--it's one of the things that was hardest for me to get my head around when I started reading about the Civil War. I served in the Army from 1966 to 1968 when replacement was all about feeding individual FNGs into line units. But then I started reading about the Iron Brigade--my great-grandfather served in Company C, 6th Wisconsin. That company started out in April 1861 with 45 men and by September was up to 105, just about its nominal strength. The Iron Brigade served in a bunch of tough fights, including Gettysburg, after which Company C of the 6th Wisconsin was down to 52 men. Company C received NO new men until January-February 1864, when the Army of the Potomac was preparing to embark on what would become known as the Overland Campaign. At that time, Company C recruited 28 new men, including Pvt Stanley Vandewalker, enlisted at Prairie Du Chien, Wisconsin. After the Battles of the Wilderness, Spotsylvania, and the North Anna (the 6th Wisconsin got to sit out Cold Harbor), and then the Siege of Petersburg and in August the Battle of Weldon Railroad, the company was down to 58 men. 34 draftees arrived in October , 1864. A couple died of disease, and one was killed at Hatcher's Run and the rest were mustered out with the old hands from 1861 and the volunteers from 1864 in August of 1865.
The volunteer regiments belonged to the states, and the state governors could get more political mileage out of forming a new regiment with new officers (beholden to the governor), than by filling up old regiments. The 6th Wisconsin was, at the end of 1863, composed largely of men whose 3 year enlistments were about to expire. If a sufficient number in the regiment agreed to re-enlist they could then call themselves "Veteran Volunteers" and would get a furlough at home. They used this opportunity to recruit. How my great-grandfather--an Indiana boy from LaPorte with a wife and two kids--managed to end up in Prairie du Chien I have no idea.
On the difference that offense and defense can make, just read this summary on Malvern Hill. Let the Union defend good ground and require the Confederates to coordinate an attack over a large area and all of a sudden, Lee and his boys don't look so brilliant.
Nicely put, and true on a strategic level, as well. The South's biggest advantage was not the quality of its generals, but its vast size. Looking at comparable European conflicts of the period: the Crimean War (1852-1856) was fought over an area smaller than New Jersey. The Second Italian War of Independence (1859-1860), the Austro-Prussian War (1866) and the Franco-Prussian Wars were fought over bits of Europe about the size of Indiana. The Confederacy had a large population and an economy as productive as most European countries, but dispersed over a forested sub-continent fortified with mountain ranges, vast swamps, and several hundred rivers.
The Southerners were excellent soldiers by the standards of their time, a good share of them determined and fiercely hostile towards the invaders, which exaggerated the problems faced by Northern armies. This is not a slight on the Union: Southern armies who invaded the North fared badly. Lee got in and out of Pennsylvania with only limited negative encounters with local resentment. However, Southern raiders who penetrated into Missouri, Kansas, Indiana, and Ohio found themselves swimming in an ocean of outraged militiamen and were cut to ribbons trying to escape southward.
Overall, Southern secessionist culture generated an aggressive cultural view of war that had important effects in campaigns and individual battles. When other factors are canceling out, and particularly when armies are green and inexperienced, the more aggressive army has a big tactical edge.
The Japanese had this advantage in the early months of World War II. Against badly trained American, Chinese, and Commonwealth forces, fast, violent campaigns won them major victories in spite of poor equipment and primitive tactics. Later in the war, more experienced Allied armies inflicted terrible defeats on them. Only the vast size and terrain advantages of the Pacific and Asian theaters of war kept the fighting going until 1945. The Union forces in the Civil War never developed the extreme technological advantages their counterparts in World War II did, but they got the job done anyway.
I would judge that the South had one really good army commander during the war--Robert E. Lee--and two commanders who were superb at handling smaller forces: Nathan Bedford Forest and Stonewall Jackson. The brilliance of Lee and Forest effected strategy directly. Grant had to collect overwhelming strength in Virginia just to fight Lee to a draw in 1864. Forest's reputation helped keep Union forces out of central Mississippi and Alabama for a year and a half after the fall of Vicksburg.
At lower ranks, Lee's eastern armies had a concentration of tough, aggressive brigade, division, and corps commanders who performed well under his leadership. Confederate commanders elsewhere were a mixed bag, many of them with severe personal flaws.
This mixed group of bad to mediocre to good Confederate generals had several advantages deriving from being on the strategic defensive.
(a) The Northern armies had to attack to win, putting far more stress on their leadership cadre.
(b) The North operated mainly in hostile territory, requiring far more resources and attention directed to supply and communications.
(c) Southern armies, operating in friendly territory, almost always had an advantage in operational and tactical intelligence.
When two mediocre generals are opposed, these advantages are a far greater force multiplier than when two superior generals are matched. Both Sherman in Georgia and Sheridan in the Shenandoah campaigned in implacably hostile country where Southern armies were used to running rings around Union armies in spite of inferior numbers. Neither of these worthies tolerated the situation. They kept their forces well in hand, insisted on good intelligence from their cavalry and scouts, and made good Confederate generals look bad over and over again.
Finally, there is the basic question of how good is a good general and how common good generals are. Jacob Cox, an excellent politician-general from Ohio, told a friend that few men are up to the job of running a division, only a small number a corps, and a bare handful could be trusted to run an army. A good military academy can provide you with a cadre of trained professional soldiers who can administratively run your army. The ruthless filter of combat experience will eventually give you a cadre of battlefield leaders. However, campaign and combat attrition might kill them or break them down faster than you can replace them. Something like 170 generals died in the Civil War. A lot more had to quit because they could take the physical and mental stress of the job.
The basic task of picking up a body of men and marching them across enemy territory is difficult enough that inferior generals like Ambrose Burnside and Braxton Bragg were kept in command even when their failings as commanders were obvious. The next guy you promoted might be much worse. He might be a egomaniac, a nervous case, or a drunk.
I would judge that the South had one really good army commander during the war--Robert E. Lee--and two commanders who were superb at handling smaller forces: Nathan Bedford Forest and Stonewall Jackson.
Not to dispute your point, but more to quibble: What about Jeb Stuart and John Singleton Mosby? I know many consider Stuart to be overrated, and certainly by the end they weren't far wrong, but his reputation was earned by earlier performance. Mosby is quite the forgotten figure, though perhaps one of the greatest guerrilla leaders in American history.
Jeb Stuart falls into the category of Lee's cadre of solid professional subordinates. James Longstreet, Jubal Early, and Stuart all performed superbly under Lee's eye, less so when off on their own.
It can seem astonishing to us armchair generals that something as elementary as insisting on good reconnaissance would be a means of discerning the difference between mediocre, good, and great generals. However, there is an element of imaginative cognition that has to exist in a commander's mind to allow him to make the best use of the intelligence at hand. Generals gifted in this area, like Lee, Sheridan, or George Washington, crave good intelligence and devote extra time and resources to seek it out. Others shuffle along with what they can get, taking stock of their fears (like Joe Johnston) or their egos (Douglas MacArthur) or both (George McClellan). Fortunately, at some point West Point began teaching people to always get the best intel and the army developed a system of training intelligence specialists to analyze it for them.
I know little of Mosby other than his reputation as being a very good guerrilla leader. He and the other guerilla leaders don't really fall into this discussion.
I agree that the quality of the leadership was about equal. These men (professional soldiers) were mostly all classmates at West Point and were baptized by fire in the Mexican War. They were all inexperienced at first, made lots of mistakes, got a lot of Americans killed.
Your point is valid that the Union looked more incompetent because they were on the offensive strategically and therefore had to attack in most early battles. The attackers will most always have more casualties.
I think an important point to remember is how they were trained to fight. The prevailing wisdom at the beginning of the war was to "mass your fire to take the position". The best way to do this was to walk men in lines towards the position and unleash "volleys" of musketry.
What happened in reality was the improved technology of the weapons made the practice of walking toward a position almost immediately obsolete.
It was acceptable to walk up to a position when everybody was using smooth-bore muskets...they arithmetic of attrition would allow you to take that position. The smooth bore projectile would as often as not miss the aiming point.
But when rifled muskets and minie ball projectiles went out into the hands of a motivated soldier, and they could be accurate out to 600 yards or so...well, the carnage was horrifying.
The generals took a long time to learn. Remember, they had to be aggressive or they would be relieved of duty. They had to find a way to fight the new battles.
By the end of the war (ie, the Petersburg siege) you could see the strategy of WW I evolving. Trench warfare.
Of course these were the "prefessionals". There were many amateur officers. They had to learn everything on the fly. Mostly through very bloody mistakes. See Daniel Sickles at Gettysburg for a good example here.
I don't know if there was a large difference in the quality of the individuals in leadership but there was a huge difference in the systems the north and south used though. Remember that the south was a confederacy with most of the power in held in the states. Davis had to ask nicely for resources and hope that he got them. Lincoln had a powerful central government at his disposal. When your trying to run a war that is just more efficient way of doing business.
"The generals took a long time to learn. "
I've seen the argument that it wasn't until WW2 that they really learned.
Based on my own reading, yes, many of the Union generals were just awful. But then, so were many of the Confederate generals. One difference may have been that incompetent generals in the North seem to have been able to get Congressional cover, and Lincoln was very aware of the need to keep Congress behind him. Meanwhile, none of the competent Northern generals had the political stature of Lee, which limited their ability to protect themselves from either incompetent underlings or political meddling.
Just to piggyback on the comment about congressional cover - many of the incompetent Union generals were appointed or retained by Lincoln for political reasons. The South had political factions to consider as well, but Lincoln had to balance the interests of the radical Republicans and the War Democrats - not an easy feat by any means. Two obvious examples of incompetents sticking around well past their "sell by date" would be McClellan (War Democrat) and Fremont (radical Republican/abolitionist).
One other thought is that the most recent hands on fighting experience for most of these officers (if they had any at all) was the Mexican-American War, which was pushed for by primarily by the South and, if memory serves correctly, the majority of volunteer soldiers were Southerners. U.S Grant would be a notable exception.
I'm just glad to have found perhaps the only other person alive who uses the word "secesh" non-ironically.
thanks, TNC, and keep up the good work.
"Secesh" was a word I first recall coming across in the movie "Glory".
Crazed Union Colonel used it a bit.
I am completely incapable of judging Glory with any kind of impartiality. That movie shreds me. I think at least half of it is from the music.
I too rewatched Glory recently. The music is dastardly. The "Give 'em hell, 54th!" scene near the end, and the swell of music, had me all choked up in spite of my intent to maintain some detachment.
On the macabre foulness of the war, and the clownish fallibility of its leadership, Charles Frazier's Cold Mountain (the book, not the bad movie) makes some decent points. There's plenty of valid criticism of the novel, but I liked bits like this:
lighthouse's point about them all being bad is well taken. That said, I think there was plenty of competence on the Union side -- in junior officers, artillery and military engineers. And then the generals.
One of my favorites is Sherman. At the start of the war, he was sidelined for saying that the South wouldn't be a pushover. You see, he ran a military academy in the South. But he was pushed aside for the conventional wisdom, and I think, for some early carpetbaggers looking to score some war glory. Southern soldiers said of him, once he began to advance, "We'd have blown up the bridge in front of him, but he probably has a spare in his baggage train."
Lee reputedly said that if you gave him Southern cavalry and Northern artillery, he could whip any army in the world. Consider that at Gettysburg, arguably Lee's biggest failure, Stuart was AWOL, the Northern artillery was brilliant, and the Southern leadership was still recovering (and really never recovered) from the loss of Jackson.
As the war went on, too, officer attrition was a huge problem. The good officers led from the front, and got slaughtered, while the bad officers skulked in the rear, and survived.
Also remember that the Union army was effectively on the defensive at Gettysburg, having seized the high ground early. Playing defense means you get to meet your enemy on your terms, and that your enemy's supply lines are stretched, or nonexistent.
Lee's most catastrophic war decision, Pickett's charge, was a desperate tactic to end the battle, as his army would stand no chance against the constant stream of well-fed and supplied soldiers marching from the Capitol, but it required offensive coordination, timing, and leadership that his army had never required in their defensive campaigns.
Northern artillery saved the Union army, and possible the war, covering the army's retreat during the peninsula campaign. It was a highly technical service and especially during the early part of war, almost exclusively professional.
TNC,
First,
Although i made 1-2 comments on the previous version of this blog, i didn't feel compelled to sign up and register in order to comment in this new version.
Until now.
I dig, your recent obsession with the civil war (as a holder of a graduate degree in history, esp.), also as a literary thing.
Re: your points, questions;
Yes, the Union was mostly badly led in many early years/battles/units of the war.
My favorite character was always Stonewall, although the JayHawks and border states are an interesting bit of history in the war.
Finally, as scholky at it might have been i always loved, Glory...
While the Union filed commanders were almost universally lousy, the Union did have an advantage in that they had a workable strategic plan for the war - basically cut the Confederacy off from the world and strangle it.
That having been said, if the Confederacy had won, I'd be sitting here pontificating on their workable plan, whatever it might have turned out to be.
As for Glory, I thought it was an outstanding movie, even if Morgan Freeman did impute better motives to the white soldiers than may have been entirely true.
And,
Re; the macabre foulness of the war,
Eastwood does a good haunted veteran of the war between the states in at least one of his films.
Outlaw Josey Wales
Can you post the reading list? I've spent a lot of time on WWII books, no time at all on the Civil War. So what should I read to, if not catch up, at least not feel stupid?
TNC -
Glory's worst sin against the historical record is the slipshod shorthand it uses for the crisis over pay -- Shaw fires his pistol, tears up his pay stub, and the thing is done. In fact the struggle went on for a year and a half. Black activists in Massachusetts had been fighting for equal militia service for more than a decade, and they had refused to recruit troops until they were guaranteed equal pay. When the War Department betrayed that promise some of them turned against black service and actively opposed recruitment. Out in the regiments men mutinied, were shot by white officers, were even courtmartialed and executed for stacking arms. Glory makes _that_ story way, way too clean. "The Colonel!" shouts Morgan Freeman, and it's over.
Keep up the Civil War blogging. It makes this historian of the era very happy that there are such engaged readers out there!
Just finished that great article from the NRO (file that statement under: "Things Dan Never Thought He'd Say"). A couple of quick reactions:
-My Civil War class in high school, we were given the opportunity to write a civil war narrative from either a Northern or Southern perspective (Since we also covered the post-bellum period, it's probably better to use those terms). The class split evenly (school is in Baltimore). I think that is definitely reflective of the "collective victory narrative" that's been instilled
-Serious props to Owens for making the "yeah, that shit was about Slavery" point
-When I first saw Gods and Generals, I was completely offended by the portrayal of the Confederacy. Why did they make these guys seem so noble? Aren't people catching on this is bullshit?
I guess I didn't understand how powerful the idea of the lost cause is. I wonder how aware the filmmaker's were of it's influence.
-The explosion wasn't the goriest part of Glory for me (I actually remember kids laughing at this part when it happened, one even suggesting we rewind the tape to see it come back together). The amputation scene had everyone squirming though.
Oh, and I love the way he talks about the South blackmailing the North with secession. It's a little too reminiscent of the current scene
Yeah, Glory is definitely reminiscent of an outdated understanding of things, but I agree that it's a great film nonetheless.
The thing that gets me about the civil war, and the especially the 'Glorious Cause' meme is how fuckin' ignorant it is. As a caucasian cracka from Kakalak, I feel about 'Cause', and the flag that represents it, roughly the same way most Germans must feel about the swastika. It's a mark of shame (in that regard, maybe we should keep it around to remind us how low we sank).
The soldiers in the confederate army, by and large, would have never been able to own slaves, and, in my opinion, were also exploited by the system that prevailed in the south. Much like today you have working class whites supporting a political party (GOP) that is beholding to the corporations that screw them over, while hating the 'others' (Mexicans) that are also exploited by the same power structure. Please, sir, may I have another?
The confederate flag is a reminder of the time when a shit-ton of southern white boys went and killed and died so that the people profiting off the societal structure that kept them at the second-to-bottom rung could keep the free labor (bottom rung).
I used to say that the great tragedy of the civil war was that the soldiers that fought for the confederacy were, by and large, exploited just as much as the slaves. And while it is true that it was not uncommon for slaves to have better food/shelter/clothing than your average sharecropper (gotta maintain the livestock, don't ya know), as I've grown in my understanding of things I now see that the fact that the sharecropper had the ability to pack up his family and leave makes all the difference in the world. Even if he had nowhere to go, the sharecropper could go, and nobody would chop off his foot for doing so.
Of course, the fact that not only did the Joe Sharecroppers not leave, but, in fact, became overseers, posse members, and eventually armed defenders of slavery, is one of the great shames of history. And that is what the civil war (and that stupid flag) means to me. When I see a white person with a confederate flag, I see someone with no true knowledge of self.
Of course, the fact that my ancestors were, by and large, episcopalian abolitionists (Mom's side) and Irish potato famine immigrants (Dad's side) may have something to do with why I'm not indoctrinated into the glorious cause bullshit.
(And you'll be seeing alot more of me commenting around here if the War of Northern Agression (lmao) is going to continue to be a regular topic.)
are we related, Lenox?
I'm an uncounted generations Tar Heel with my dad's side being famine immigrants ('47) who settled in and around Asheville, and they've not moved since. (and no, HintonHelper ain't my real name, though we're from the same town)
I'm proud of many generations of scalawaggery in my family and bear the grudge of those generations of class warfare from the war of planters' secession right on through today.
Lucky for me, I'm headed to nyc to pay Prof Foner a visit in a few weeks too to help inform what I know even more...
what say you, Lenox?
heh, you never know with us Micks...
The Irish side of my family settled on the coast, tho, and never made it inland past the port of Wilmington. Which, on an unrelated note, has always been a real demon for me, as I wonder what role my blood played in the massacre that happened there at the turn of the 20th century. I know the poor Irish were largely the footsoldiers of that abomination, so I'm almost afraid to know the answer to my questions.
It actually goes pretty deep, as some of us (my fam) think that my grandfather's father may have been 'passing', hence my grandfather being raised in an orphanage despite his mother being still alive and involved in his life until he was well into adulthood. The official story told by the older generation is that she was too poor to support him, which may be true, but we have very curly, dark hair and facial features that, while not being definitive, do raise the possibility. And I've sat in my great-Aunts and Uncles living rooms hearing story after story of our past, but they NEVER EVER mention my grandfather's father, and whenever I've asked, they change the subject right quick. I've always thought that after my grandfather passes, I'm going to go back there and dig until I find the truth. But for now, he's a very old man, who I love very much, waiting to die, and as much as I don't believe in hiding from what's real, I just can't bring myself to put him through bringing the family skeletons into the open (even if I don't personally believe they should have been skeletons in the first place).
All this even though finding that I have a black man in my family tree would make my fuckin' day :) All in due time, I suppose...
Hey TNC,
Longtime reader here; I'm a scholar of African Diaspora religions (Afro-Carib, Lat-Am, Afro-Am), and I wonder how much you're read about the Haitian Revolution...it might put into perspective some of your nascent insights concerning the phenomenon of the "slave turned soldier." A great place to start would be Michel Rolph-Trouillot's brilliant (and accessible IMHO) book of essays, _Silencing the Past_, which in turn might help answer some of your questions re: the Civil War, among them, why Black involvement, military as well as civilian, is not more widely acknowledged.
Also, a passing thought--must get back to the dissertation!--you remarked, "Black history as suffering is wrong. But so is black history as a revenge flick." I think this comment points up one problem with 'emplotting' history as a particular kind of narrative, with a beginning, middle, end, and 'take home' moral. (Hayden White's prob. written most cogently about this, and about the political implications of what narrative 'genre' a particular set of events is narrated within). What stories about us as a people do our histories help us to tell? What histories are excluded, based on the images of ourselves we want to project? These are a couple of the questions your recent postings on the Civil War bring to mind (and animate my own research, in a religious idiom).
So on the money with that. I would expand that thought to a criticism I have of views of history in a compartmentalized fashion, as if there is a black history, which is different from a white history, which is different from a brown history, etc.
It speaks to the underlying assumption that we are, or have ever been truly separate from each other. As if the lives led by black people didn't affect the lives of the white people around them, and visa versa. As if there would be the America we know without the African aspect of our heritage.
This is why I have a problem with Black History Month, and the African-American Literature section, and so on. 'Roots' is one of the finest pieces of American Literature ever written period, George Washington Carver (sorry, had to go there) is one of the most brilliant Americans ever, and our capital was, in my understanding, designed by a black dude.
I know some folks will take me wrong here, and I want to be clear that I'm not trying in any way to diminish the blackness of these things (just as I'm not trying to deny the blackness of soul food when I point out that I grew up on collards - and pot liquor, watermelon, and fried chicken, as did lots of other southern whites). To the contrary, I believe the blackness of these things is something to be celebrated and loved. It is part of who we all are, and Black American History is my history, and every other American's, despite where our different ancestors originated from. Just as Benjamin Franklin belongs to all Americans, so does Sojourner Truth and Harriet Tubman (one of my absolute personal heroes).
What could be more American than W.E.B. Dubois' exhortations to rise above and become better through learning and debate? I just referenced his Wikipedia page to double check that I knew what I was talking about, and I noticed he was on some list of the 100 greatest African-Americans. And that's true, I'm sure. But, to me, he was one of the greatest Americans, as were many other black people throughout our history and into this strange present we live in.
Don't get me wrong, I understand why we have Black History Month, and the NAACP, and even the African-American Literature section. And I also realize that the fact that I even feel the need to point out that these people and things are great in the overall American spectrum, regardless of color, is indicative of the subconscious tendency in the American mind to assume that black means lesser. But I can't tell you how much I look forward to the day when middle school teachers read the 'I Have A Dream Speech' during an assembly that isn't in February.
wow, well said. I just wonder if we'll ever have the nuance to balance and incorporate our fractured histories.
I wonder if you could arrange a sidebar, similar to your articles list, of books you mention in the blog, perhaps according to topic. I have a few of them noted, but it would be nice to have a ready reference.
And I agree with the poster above, a comparison with the slave rebellions in the Caribbean would be interesting, if you eventually wanted to move on to that.
I like the idea of the sidebar. You could probably get a bonus if The Atlantic could figure out some kind of deal with Powell's or B & N, too, Ta-Nehisi! Everyone wins!
Diarrhea is common in most all wars - in battle men are crowded together, unwashed, in frequent contact with bodily fluids, excrement, and fouled water. Even without battle, it's hard to keep clean on campaign - most diarrhea is "ass-to-mouth disease" - and the best way to cure it is rest, decent food, and fluids. Disease is often a bigger killer than the enemy.
I'm a former Marine (I don't refer to myself as a vet, as I was never deployed) and I did lots of field training, including SERE. I lost count of the times I had swamp-ass, the field-runs, and don't get me started on blisters. And that was in the modern day military with Navy Corpsmen at every turn ready to apply antiseptic ointment and modern day field bandages to any and all cuts and scrapes. I still have the scar on my thumb from when I sliced my hand open on Constantina wire during the Parris Island crucible (2nd Battalion, Fox Company, platoon 2029, 4/16/99) and if that shiz had happened back in the day, I'd probably have had a stump where my jerk-off hand used to be after having that mufuka chopped off with an axe.
"Swamp-ass" is now officially in my vocabulary.
This was especially true in the Civil War and previously-- germ theory was pretty much pioneered in the Civil War era, IIRC, and doctors only got in the habit of washing their hands around then.
The Union leadership problem mainly came from the fact that before 1860 the US Armed Forces were disporpotionately Southern at all levels, officer and enlisted. Southerners simply had a greater interest in military service, as evidenced by the fact that VMI and the Citadel were both founded before the war to train extra officers from the south since the demand was so high. This meant once the war started there were more good and experience Southern officers than Northern ones in raw numbers, and since the Northern Army was larger than the Southern their ratio of experienced vs new recruit was even lower. Further, since the north's population advantage was largely based on urban cities where most people had never really used a gun before, while the average southern had been hunting. A huge number of southern soldiers supplied their own weapons which meant that while their weapons were of lower quality than their northern counterpart they were better versed in its use. Finally, to add to the excellent point made above about the tactical advatages of being the defender, since most of the war took place in southern states the south had people in their armies who knew the land very, very well which helps a lot. All of this combined to make the south a far, far better fighting force man for man, which is how they won basically all of the battles for the first 2 years of the war despite being completely outnumbered and out supplied. They lost mainly due to attrition and the strategic weakness of always fighting on your own ground and basically never playing offense.
That is all pretty much because of slavery also.
Upperclass white sons became officers since their wealth was ensured by the plantation and they needed something to do. Poor whites joined the army because there weren't any jobs, hard to compete with slaves.
TNC: Saw you at B&N tonight which was great. While I loved your stuff before I'm hooked after hearing the shout to the Von Erichs. Have you read US Grant's memoirs? It's unreal in terms of first hand accounts. He repeatedly connects the Civil War with the Mexican War which is interesting. Probably telling you something you know but he was broke and dying when he set out to write it, hoping to pay his debts and set up his family, so it's short on BS...you should check it out if you haven't already. One thing that blows me away is how young everyone was in the Civil War including a lot of the officers. I think you referenced "This Republic of Suffering" a few weeks ago. I haven't made it through the whole thing but I sometimes wonder how much of the whole "Lost Cause" myth was fueled by what must have been the incredible sadness and emptiness from all that death and destruction and a need to find some meaning in all the carnage. It doesn't make the cause right, but it makes the desire for a myth understandable. We do the same thing today when we talk about the 4500 troops that died in Iraq defending our freedom. David Carr's attitude is probably the exception to how people choose to deal with the Joe Campbell stuff.
JD: I don't know about the correlation "Southerners had greater interest in the military thus VMI and Citadel". What's your line on that one? Are you saying demand for Southern officers specifically exceeded that for Northern officers so they cranked up military academies or Southerners had excess supply of willing cadets? Maybe some went off to the military academies because they were after a job and not because they were uniquely martial? I think there might have also been a different approach to how one was educated in the 1800s that should be considered. Martial training used to be a huge part of education and for good reason. When the Citadel was founded in 1842 the US was 30 years removed from invasion. Charleston was absolutely THUMPED for a month during the Revolutionary War. That might have made you want to put together a military academy in Charleston just as the British rolling up the Hudson makes West Point seem like a good idea in 1802. In 1846 the US invaded Mexico...gotta think the US Army was hiring young Lt's and Captains regardless of where they were educated. And the Mexican War was such a Gallant Adventure that a lot of people signed up just for the fun of it all.
Eric K: Are you suggesting that all or the majority of CSA officers were upper class and that the enlisted troops signed up because there weren't any jobs? I agree with you that there were probably a lot of people that needed something to do but I doubt it was because the life of a plantation heir was so boring and secure. I would be really surprised if the majority of military officers at the time were independently wealthy (I'm talking pre 1860/ let's make the local head honcho a General in the Provisional Army). How many general officers were there during the Civil War in total? 600? I know you could be "elected" an officer by your troops during that time and also that promotions were often given in lieu of medals...I don't think the advancement structure was as rigid as it is today. There were also a lot of officers on both sides that started out enlisted in the Mexican or Civil Wars and were promoted to officer ranks.
Regarding enlisted troops, it's not like there was a standing Rebel army pre 1860 which was a place of employment for white labor. I think the standing US army had 16K troops between the Mexican War and 1859. That's not a huge number considering the population. It's also not like all Southerners went tromping off to war because it was a great job. By 1862 all white males between 18 and 35 were conscripted. The US Army suspected that there were never more than 500,000 ACSA troops in the field in a given year (estimates because official records went with Richmond), the bulk of whom were conscripted.
Yeah, the idea that people joined up in the military because of "lack of jobs" is pretty odd. This was a national crisis, plenty of emotion on either side, and I don't see how the huge volunteer armies that sprang up in 1860-1861 could have had much to do with economic conditions. Also, after 1862, the larger part of the Southern armies were draftees, the Union armies somewhat less so, with massive volunteer pushes driven by citizen efforts to avoid the stigma of the draft.
A case could be made the the South had the advantages of its quasi-feudal class system. As European visitors liked to note, the slave states were run by "gentlemen" who were used to giving orders and the South presumably had a large class of "peasants" who were used to taking them. Make of that what you will.
The professional military in the 19th Century was considered by most citizens to be, at best, a necessary evil. Southern culture was vaguely less hostile to professional soldiers than Northern culture. Militia service was more popular in the South, as I recall, because of paranoia about slave rebellions. Regular army officers were underpaid and under-appreciated, considered to be, at best, government bureaucrats in nice uniforms, at worst, eccentrics and probably drunks. Regular soldiers were generally considered trash not really fit for jobs in the REAL world. When war started, of course, volunteer officers and soldiers were widely respected and the professionals suddenly considered very valuable. The social rules changed drastically, as might be expected.
I meant that there was an excess of southern demand for military acadamies, sorry for any confusion. Though, given their superior performance we saw during the war, I would not be suprised if there was extra demand as well.
JD: not trying to hammer. Here's someone who's broken down US Army officer stats heading into the Civil War:
Much is often made of the supposition that a disproportionately large number of West Point graduates went South. While it is of course true that many exceptionally capable officers did follow their states into secession, a majority of trained officers stayed with the Union. Of the 1249 known living graduates when the war commenced, 89 per cent served in either the Union or Confederate armies. Of this 89 per cent nearly three fourths were in the Federal armies. While figures vary, it is recorded that 296 West Point graduates joined the Confederacy. Of these over 13 per cent were born in the North and over 11 per cent appointed from the free states.
Of the 1098 officers in the Regular Army at the outbreak of the war, one record lists 286 who resigned and joined the Confederacy. Of this number 187 were West Point graduates, and 99 non-West Pointers. Of those who did go with the South, 26 were appointed from the North, including 16 West Point graduates. One estimate states that out of 350 West Point graduates from slave states who were in military service at the beginning of the war, 162 remained with the North and 168 went South. Of the Regular Army enlisted men, only 26 are recorded as having joined the South, a surprisingly low figure.
Source: "The Civil War Day By Day" by E.B. Long
Dig that, 1249 known living graduates at the outbreak of war. 3.2 million served in both armies but only 1249 professional officers available at the start of the war. In war, on the job training is the most expensive kind of training.
Of course, one big advantage to drawing the bulk of your recruits from cities is that they were less susceptible to disease than their rural counterparts, having already been exposed to (and survived) all sorts of nastiness. This point is noted in "The Killer Angels" in connection the devastation by disease of the volunteer forces from Maine.
hey, tnc, i know you like WoW -- have you ever considered being a civil war reenactor? 10 years or so ago there was an encampment on the right bank of the charles river in boston. i think the participants were representing the 54th Mass.: tents all over the place, black people in union uniform, educational exhibits, sewing and cooking going on. i walked through the camp as if in sturbridge village, mass., or williamsburg, virginia. talk about role playing games!
of course if you can only spare eight hours out of the weekend instead of half of all your entire weekends, well, never mind!
I've always been of two minds about the leadership of the Union, but I'm not sure the "attack vs. Defense" issue is enough to explain it. On the one hand, you have Grant leaving his supply chain behind to march through the swamps to take Vicksburg and Sherman "making the South howl" with his march first to Atlanta and then on to Charleston through hostile territory, all while keeping Joe Johnston at arms length. Both are examples of men fighting a new kind of war to solve a unique problem. On the other hand, you have McClellan on the peninsula. I can forgive McClellan much for saving the Union army after Bull Run - for really turning it into an army. But his steadfast refusal to do anything with that army must have been infuriating. One has to admire Lincoln's patiencefor putting up with his bluster for so long. But if McClellan on the peninsula is infuriating, Meade on the fourth day at Gettysburg is criminal, and Burnside at Fredricksburg is utterly insupportable. Burnside threw away thousands of lives after it became clear there wasn't a chance in hell the Federals would take Mayre's Heights. And yet he retained his command long enough the fuck up before Petersburg, as well. After all those charges uphill against a dug-in, well-supplied defense, I think anybody would have agreed that Burside deserved to be shot. Similarly, Meade's failure to exploit Lee's disarray on the 4th day at Getttysburg may have added two whole years to the war. The only upside is that - by allowing Lee to continue to fight until his army was completely exhausted in every sense, and by allowing Sherman the chance to remove what little remaining ability the South had to make war, Meade's failure to attack and/or capture Lee's columns as they marched away from Gettysburg probably saved the nation from any chance of a protracted guerilla conflict.
The South was brilliantly led because it had to be. With no resources and such numerical inferiority, there was an enormous selection pressure to produce a Lee, a T.J. Jackson, a Bedford Forrest. The Union had resources and men, and needed to overwhelm the South so that it would no longer want to make war. So you got straightforward butchers like Grant and Sherman. And that dichotomy is, I think, one of the really compelling things about the war.
Sorry for being pedantic. Love this blog, love Civil War history. Not sure if I can handle the two at once.
"It's amazing to think people died of diarrhea in those days."
People still die of diarrhea, just not usually in the U.S. or other first world countries. It's not unheard of in parts of the developing world though. Which reminds me of something: Carl Sagan had an essay in Parade magazine years ago, about the universality of sports, or something like that. He mentioned that in some undeveloped part of Africa, the locals named their team (I forget what sport it was) the local equivalent of "The Diarrhea". Which makes as much sense, if you think about it, as the University of Miami calling its team the Hurricanes: they both can kill, right?
OT: Apologies for the thread jacking, but I figure that this thread's been live for almost 12 hours, so it's fair game...
TNC: met you and Carr at B&N in NYC tonight. Thank you for the wonderful reading/experience with Carr. So glad I came and can't wait to read your book.
Since you're getting an Atlantic DC intern, I might as well invest more and try to contribute since someone else will be tasked with moderating comments. There's mucho high standards here, but I would love to be a part of the conversation.
ALSO, I saw Kenyatta sitting on the aisle talking with Carr's wife, and can I just say (even as a gay man): WOW!!! You one lucky dude. I'm sure her intellect outshines us both. But serio, dude? Wow. Nice work for a WoW playah.
Also, how was dinner with the Carrs? Where'd you go? (Yeah, I was spying.)
Sorry one more OT: (that I wish I'd asked at the reading)
You dealt with fathers, like Carr.
You ever deal with addiction, like Carr?
Thanks for all the props. Send an e-mail, or wait for the open thread at noon. I'll gladly answer. I try to avoid threadjacking...
"Swamp-ass" is now officially in my vocabulary.
This reply was supposed to be placed further up orginally. I might be random, but I'm not *that* random.
As Lincoln might have put it "Its true that you are inept. They too inept. You are both inept together."
Leadership on both sides was scandalously, comically inept. There isn't a general on either side that would have lasted a month with any real responsibility in, for example, Napoleon's army. Dig the Chickamauga campaign and battle (well into 1863) for an example of how the leaders never got it together.
What the Union had over time was a superior class of NCOs that could handle companies and regiments adequate to the task.
Just a slight quibble regarding Chickamauga. While I totally agree with you that that battle as a whole was a horrendous, chaotic mish-mash that didn't leave either army looking particularly great, U.S. General George Thomas did emerge with an enhanced reputation as "the Rock of Chickamauga" who saved the Union army with his stubborn defense. The fact that he was a native Virginian who was fiercely loyal to the U.S. makes him an even more interesting figure.
I love Thomas' quote after the battle of, I believe, Chattanooga. A soldier laying out the graveyard asked if he should bury the dead by state and Thomas said something along the lines of - "Nah, mix 'em up. I'm tired of States Rights." Indeed.
Leadership on both sides was scandalously, comically inept. There isn't a general on either side that would have lasted a month with any real responsibility in, for example, Napoleon's army.
Of course, the officers in Napoleon's army had been fighting on and off for twelve years or so before the era of his classic campaigns. The armies of the Civil War had to duplicate this experience in twelve months.
Dig the Chickamauga campaign and battle (well into 1863) for an example of how the leaders never got it together.
. . . And execute similar maneuvers in what was, by European standards, a howling wilderness. Chickamauga was fought in terrain Napoleon would have avoided at all costs. Rosecrans and Bragg had no choice in the matter. However, the descriptions I've read of Napoleonic battles feature the same kind of mistakes, made for the same reasons, as I've found in descriptions of Civil War battles. The intellectual and emotional skills (and limits) of the men leading the troops seem a key factor in both periods.
Overall, aside from the usual suspects, like Bragg's quarrelsome nature and bull-headed agressiveness and Polk's dull-witted marching and maneuvering, I find little to fault in the troop-handling at Chickamauga. Both sides kept their forces well in hand, considering the horrible terrain, until the fatal error that cost Rosecrans the battle. The Union forces not stampeded by Longstreet's breakthrough fought well, some withdrawing in good discipline, some fighting with courage and skill under Thomas's command to cover the army's escape.
“Stand up you cowards, they couldn’t hit an elephant at this distance.” -General John Sedgwick’s last words.
"Gen. Grant habitually wears an expression as if he had determined to drive his head through a brick wall and was about to do it." - Unknown Union Soldier
"In firing his gun, John Brown has merely told what time of day it is. It is high noon." -William Lloyd Garrison
"You are green, it is true; but they are green also. You are all green alike." - A. Lincoln to commander I. McDowell before First Manassas.
"War is cruelty. There is no use trying to reform it. The crueler it is, the sooner it will be over" -WIlliam Tecumsah Sherman
"It is well that war is so terrible--we should grow too fond of it" -Robert E. Lee
"I do not want to make this charge. I do not see how it can succeed. I would not make it now but that General Lee has ordered it and expects it." -James Longstreet before ordering Pickett's Charge at Gettysburg
"All this has been my fault." -Robert E. Lee after Pickett's Charge
"That old man...had my division massacred at Gettysburg!" -G. Pickett said these words to John S. Mosby shortly after paying Lee a visit in Richmond
"Well, it made you famous"-Mosby's reply to Pickett
"We talked the matter over and could have settled the war in thirty minutes had it been left to us." -A common Rebel soldier made this statement after fraternizing with a Union soldier between the lines.
""In giving freedom to the slave, we assure freedom to the free - honorable alike in what we give and what we preserve. We shall nobly save, or meanly lose, the last, best hope of earth." - A. Lincoln to Congress 1862
That's a slight misquote of Sedgwick. Supposedly his final words were "Stand up you cowards! They couldn’t hit an elephant at this dist"
ah, yes.
that would be the late general john "elephant" sedgwick.
yeh, I've seen that quote :)
Shouldn't it be,
"Stand up you cowards! They couldn’t hit an elephant at this dist...oooof"
although that's not right either. Hit in the left cheek wasn't he? probably didn't make a sound.
and on a serious note, the Union lost one of their finest generals when he went down. He was one of the competent and brave ones.
A few assorted comments, many of which have been previously touched on.
1. One significant area where the Confederates had a big advantage, and one which is absolutely critical in operations, was in intelligence. In the Civil War period, this mainly meant cavalry, and for almost the entire war, the confederate cavalry was far superior to that of the north. No matter how good a general is, he's going to look bad if he doesn't know where the enemy is or how many men the enemy has, especially if the enemy knows those things that he doesn't. I remember in the Shelby Foote history it was amazing how, prior to almost every battle, the Pinkerton agency intelligence service was feeding incoorect and inaccurate intel to the Union commanders. This intel probably directly led to the failure to achieve a victory at Antietam, wit McClellan holding back several divisions in reserve to counter the large numbers of confederates that he thought Lee hadn't committed, but which didn't actually exist.
2. I think almost all historical memory of the war, and this issue of a supposed leadership gap is no exception, suffers from an overemphasis on the eastern theatre of operations. In the west, where the war was actually won, the Union had superior generalship almost the entire war, and achieved fairly steady progress. One of the more interest arguments/counterfactuals I've read about indicts Lee for focusing his effort on the east, whereas the real area where the confederates had a good chance to achive important victories was Tennessee. Lee should have detached some of his forces to that theater to attempt a breakthrough there. But his parochialism led to a failure of his grand strategy which doomed the confederate cause. (A failure that Grant, as a western general, didn't share.)
3. When talking about military leadership, you need to be fairly specific. Effective leadership at the small unit level is different from that at the divisional level, which is different from that at the army level. And as far as overall campaigns and battle strategy goes, I thought the union generals often had good enough plans/strategy. The failures tended to be in execution. (I'd say the basic idea behind both the peninsular campaign and the Fredericksburg battle were sound--use the union's numerical superiorty to split forces, with on holding the main confederate force while executing a flanking movement to win the day. This basic strategy was the one used by Sherman over and over in campaign from Tennessee to Atlanta. They just never pulled it off. There's also the issue, raised above, about the quality of individual soldiers. BEtter soldiers make generals look better too. Just look at Gettysburg--the south was attacking an entrenched, numerically superior enemy that had the high ground. And yet time after time the confederates came within a hair's breadth of breaking the lines of the union. That's just an incerdible achievement and testimony to the high quality of their infantry. When the union had similar situations at Cold Harbor and Spotsylvania, they were slaughtered.
When the union had similar situations at Cold Harbor and Spotsylvania, they were slaughtered.
Spotsylvania is more comparable to Gettysburg, while Cold Harbor was more like Fredericksburg. At Spotsylvania, a sudden, well-timed Union attack on the Confederate center ruined Bushrod Johnson's division and threatened to destroy the Confederate army, just as Longstreet's attack on Sickle's III Corps had done at Gettysburg. At Gettysburg, the successful attack was not well supported, Meade sent in sacrifical counterattacks to slow the enemy down, and his reserves were able to rebuild his line. At Spotsylvania, the II Corps attack was not well supported, Lee sacrificed the pick of his army in suicidal counterattacks to slow the Union advance, and his reserves built a new line behind them.
Both sides suffered horrible losses in the fighting in front of the Round Tops and Cemetary Ridge, both sides suffered horribly at the Bloody Angle at Spotsylvania. In both cases, the battle was winnable by either side. Cold Harbor was hopeless as fought, Fredericksburg nearly so.
One of the more interest arguments/counterfactuals I've read about indicts Lee for focusing his effort on the east, whereas the real area where the confederates had a good chance to achieve important victories was Tennessee. Lee should have detached some of his forces to that theater to attempt a breakthrough there. But his parochialism led to a failure of his grand strategy which doomed the Confederate cause.
Did Lee ever have the authority to direct such a strategy, at a time when it would have mattered?
Seems to me the Confederate fixation on operations Virginia and the immediately surrounding region can be attributed less to Lee's own, personal "parochialism" than to out-sized role Virginia played culturally and politically in the Confederacy, and the fact that its capital was there. After all, those brave boys in blue, marching out of Washington toward the First Manassas/Bull Run weren't shouting, "on to Nashville!"
Did Lee ever have the authority to direct such a strategy, at a time when it would have mattered?
He was offered such authority in 1863 and turned it down. Not interested.
If he'd offered advice on a strategy of this sort at any time after 2nd Bull Run through to the end of the war, it would have been received gratefully. Davis had no other decent generals to put in charge, just a bunch of prima donnas and foul-ups.
“Press on, press on, men.” -Stonewall Jackson on the march in the Shenendoah Valley 1862.
Jackson inquired sharply about a missing courier and was told that the boy had just been killed while delivering a message under fire,
“Very commendable, very commendable,” was Jackson’s reply.
“Boys, he isn’t much for looks, but if we’d had him we wouldn’t have been caught in this trap.” -A captive Federal to his fellows at Harpers Ferry in reference to Stonewall Jackson
“Headquarters in the Saddle,” Gen. John Pope’s heading on his dispatches.
His troops about Pope, “He had his headquarters where his hindquarters ought to be.”
“God damn McDowell, He’s never where I want him." -Gen Pope at 2nd Manassas on learning that Gen. McDowell was lost behind Federal lines.
“What are you fighting for anyhow?” -Union soldier to a confederate prisoner.
“I’m fighting because you are down here.” -Confederate prisoner to Union soldier.
"Great God, General Hood, where is your splendid division?" -Robert E. Lee to John Bell Hood after Antietam
"They are lying upon the field where you sent them, sir." -John Bell Hood. Roughly two-thirds of his brigade were killed and wounded in the fighting at "The Cornfield."
second the recommendation for grant's memoirs. couple things about it:
1) it's surprisingly funny. he had that droll, understated western wit that you'll recognize from twain or lincoln. twain actually published the memoirs, but i don't think he did any ghost-writing--grant was funny on his own.
2) he is also very blunt in his rejection of the legitimacy of the annexation of texas. the war with mexico was nothing other than a naked land-grab in grant's view, and completely unjustified. the founding myths of texas independence are blown to smithereens, by someone who knew a fair bit about it, and fought in the war that led to it.
3) one of grant's off-hand comments about an advantage of the southern officer corps is relevant to your question about leadership. he's describing the west point graduates, formerly federal officers, who joined the rebellion:
"They had no standing army and, consequently, these trained soldiers had to find employment with the troops from their own States. In this way, what there was of military education and training was distributed throughout their whole army. The whole loaf was leavened."
so he thinks there was more military professionalism spread throughout the southern army.
after you read grant's memoirs, you might also enjoy--in an entirely different vein--tony horwitz's book "confederates in the attic." it's a hilarious and terrifying journey through the southern obsession with the war, and how it plays into contemporary sociology and politics. there are occasional cheap shots in it, kind of like in 'borat', but it's still a real eye-opener.
I second the recommendation of Confederates in the Attic as both "hilarious and terrifying."
EP mentioned the Haitian revolution up top, and I have to say that the Hatian connection with the Civil War is often overlooked. One of the things that brought the slavery issue to a head was the fact that there were all these new states being carved out of the Louisiana Purchase, and most of them were Northern states, which always threatened to upset the 50-50 balance in the Senate. (This is yet another reason to reject the view that the Civil War wasn't about slavery: slavery was the single biggest issue on the federal agenda for most of the first half of the 19th century, and it kept coming up every time a new state was up for admission).
But the Louisiana Purchase itself came about because of Toussaint de l'Ouverture and the slave rebellion in (I think) 1798. Napoleon originally had wanted to use the island then called Saint Domingue as France's base in the new world, with naval connection to Quebec and Louisiana. After the slave revolts it was obvious that would never work because the French would have their hands full just keeping the peace in Port au Prince. So Napoleon decided to cut his losses and get something for the underdeveloped Missouri basin, which was useless to France without naval access. At the time, New Orleans was something of an open port because it drained the Mississippi and it was crawling with Americans. Jefferson's administration was wrestling with how to ensure access and passage in New Orleans, and then Napoleon dropped the whole Missouri basin into his lap. I'm going by memory here, and I forget how Napoleon finessed the Missouri basin out of Spain, but I think this is generally right.
The irony is that the Louisiana Purchase was a huge land purchase that was itself peaceful but led to two wars: the US Civil War, and - because it provided financing that Napoleon otherwise wouldn't have had, after ten-plus years of revolution in France - Napoleon's sweep across Europe. So, long story short, in one of those great convergences of history, Toussaint de l'Ouverture brought us both Appomattox and the Congress of Vienna.
So true re: Grant on Texas. I was born and raised in Dallas and Grant's book was a slap across the face of all the Texas history I ever learned growing up.
Poor leadership?
What's the standard? If you read in WWII history you find that the Greatest Generation had pretty bad leadership. Read Atkinson's "An Army at Dawn". Look at Korea--MacArthur almost got his troops annihilated. And I don't remember much enlightened leadership from Westy in Vietnam.
Given the learning required to use new technologies and the mass armies, the Civil War leadership was reasonable, about as good as General Motors leadership has been over the last 50 years.
There's an essay on the movie Glory in the book Past Imperfect: History According to the Movies. It got pretty good marks for accuracy overall (as I recall), but the movie wildly overstated the number of ex-slaves in the 54th--there were no more than a handful, the vast majority of the troops being from established Northern free black families. Also, the unit's sergeant major was one Lewis Douglass, a son of Frederick Douglass--the movie has a scene with the elder Douglass but does not mention his personal connection to the 54th.
On the general subject of "History as Revenge Flick", I have long been impressed by the iciness of the following presidential proclamation. It was issued in response to Southern threats to try US Army officers in charge of black troops on (death-penalty) charges of inciting slave revolts, and to enslave black Union prisoners. The CSA never carried out either policy on a sustained basis, for reasons that should be obvious:
[begin quote]
July 30, 1863
Executive Mansion
Washington, D.C.
It is the duty of every government to give protection to its citizens, of whatever class, color, or condition, and especially to those who are duly organized as soldiers in the public service. The law of nations and the usages and customs of war as carried on by civilized powers, permit not distinction as to color in the treatment of prisoners of war as public enemies. To sell or enslave any captured person, on account of his color, and for no offence against the laws of war, is a relapse into barbarism and a crime against the civilization of the age.
The government of the United States will give the same protection to all its soldiers, and if the enemy shall sell or enslave anyone because of his color, the offense shall be punished by retaliation upon the enemy’s prisoners in our possession.
It is therefore ordered that for every soldier of the United States killed in violation of the laws of war, a rebel soldier shall be executed; and for every one enslaved by the enemy or sold into slavery, a rebel soldier shall be placed at hard labor on the public works and continued at such labor until the other shall be released and received the treatment due to a prisoner of war.
Abraham Lincoln
[end quote]
By all means, read both An Army at Dawn and The Day of Battle. Rick Atkinson covers the American involvement in the North African campaign in the first book, Sicily and Italy in the second. War as grand tragedy, from the highest ranks of command to the infantry in the trenches. Brilliant told, insightful.
Max Hastings, I think, praised Atkinson for writing of the generals and admirals as not being legendary "Great Captains," but men with some skill and some limitations, doing their best at jobs that would have taxed the powers--and egos--of Napoleon or Alexander.
TNC,
You have one bunch of smart, well-read, posters. I don't agree with some of their assertions, but that doesn't take anything away from them.
You asked, "Was the Union really as poorly led as it seems? I've been doing a lot of reading about The Siege of Petersburg, and The Crater, in particular. Apparently, two of the generals in the fight, stayed behind the lines, drinking themselves silly, while Union soldiers were slaughtered." [How do you do that grey highlight thing for quotes, anyway?]
The Crater was a good idea, that went very wrong. It went wrong for a many reasons, including some terrible leadership, as well as the confused nature of war.
Union leadership, given the circumstances, was amazingly good. Meade, Sherman, Sheridan, Grant, and Chamberlain, were pretty damn good. I think the knock on Meade for not chasing Lee down and finishing him and the war after Gettysburg in 1863, is unfounded. His troops were exhausted after the battle. To expect his men to reform, refit, and rest, to the point where they could go into major combat again is not to understand the nature of war, close combat, and the conditions of 1-3 July 1863.
The Civil War presaged the industrialization of war. No one was prepared for The Rivers of Blood. How could they have been? What soldier ever is?
I have never had much respect for Lee. He was on the wrong side of history, knew it, and still led a protracted war for naught. Natty Gentleman of The South. Crap-a-doodle-doo.
adin,
I agree with your comments on the community TNC has gathered here. It's hard to find an "oasis" of thought in the desert that is the internet, but TNC has built a nice one here. That and the fact the TNC is as fascinated with the Civil War as I makes me an avid reader. (Much to the chagrin of the people that pay me and disregarding the work piling on my desk.)
Anyway, back to the conversation...
The gentlemen you site are in positions of authority in the latter part of the war. They didn't come to prominence until the less competent generals above them were cast aside or as they called it back in the day "cashiered". Don't forget those names...McClellan, Pope, Fremont, Rosecrans...there is an extensive list. Of course this happened on both sides. Maybe less so on the Confederate.
Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain was a hero. I much admire him. He wasn't a professional either. He was a college professor before he joined the union effort.
Uh...not sure I can quite agree here. Your points are valid on the exhaustion of his troops. But so were Lee's. The day after the battle he had Lee's army backed up against a nearly unfordable river and in a very vulnerable state. He should have at least applied pressure to him to see what developed. He may have been able to end the war right then with an extraordinary effort. I think that demanded he try.
use blockquote to begin and /blockquote to end. Surround both with "" at the back.
yikes, that didn't work out. Enclose the blockquote and /blockquote with the "less than" and "greater than" symbols also called the open angle bracket and close angle bracket.
Webmonkey has a cheat sheet here: http://www.webmonkey.com/reference/HTML_Cheatsheet
. . . For those of us with web-literacy issues. Note that I was unable to make their "link" tags work. The italics, on the other hand . . .
"I think the knock on Meade for not chasing Lee down and finishing him and the war after Gettysburg in 1863, is unfounded." Ah...not sure I can quite agree here. Your points are valid on the exhaustion of his troops. But so were Lee's. The day after the battle he had Lee's army backed up against a nearly unfordable river and in a very vulnerable state. He should have at least applied pressure to him to see what developed. He may have been able to end the war right then with an extraordinary effort. I think that demanded he try.
This was Lincoln's viewpoint, and the difference he saw between so many of his generals and the Confederates. That killer instinct, the drive to take the risks and finish the job.
Meade had Lee backed up against the Potomac a week after Gettysburg, not a day, but the issue is the same. He had enough troops to fight, by the numbers, but his army had taken a terrible beating and he didn't think it was in shape to beat Lee's army on the defensive. An opportunity lost.
Replying to both mjnewt0n and Sebastian [and attempting to use the blockquote majik of the >]
Sebastian wrote:
You are right that was Lincoln's view, until he, on or about 8 July, realized the full scope of Union casualties at Gettysburg. After that date, he rethought his first reaction. He was also lucky that he had the veterans of Gettysburg to backup Union troops who rushed to put down the draft riots in NYC.
Surely Grant, Sherman, Meade, and Sheridan had the "killer instinct." Of course it's weak speculation, but I think it would have been a gigantic stretch to think that the two exhausted armies could have done anything more than spill more blood without a decisive outcome. Maybe the Confederates would have fought even more ferociously than the Union troops, as the rebels faced certain annihilation.
mjnewt0n wrote:
I agree, but I don't see the purging of the incompetent leadership as the "latter part of the war." I think it was the second half of the war. Unlike the Europeans, we had no professional standing military cadre. It took awhile to raise a huge army, train it, and lead it. I am in no way apologizing for lousy generals like McClellan [who reminds me of Mark Clark, and Montgomery in WW2 as described by Atkinson]. I just think that it took an understandable amount of time for the Union to get its act together.
And if the blockquote thing works out, I thank you both.
Uh. I guess it didn't work out. Hmmm. I'll have to work on it.
A simple answer: The generals commanding the union armies in the East up until 1864 were in over their heads. In the west, several excellent generals emerged much earlier. For the last 15 months of the war, the Union had the superiority in commanding generals - Grant in Virginia, Sherman in Georgia and the Carolinas, Thomas in the West, and also the best subordinate general in Sheridan. They still had a lot of duds - most notably the political generals: Butler, Banks, Sigel. (Although Butler deserves credit for coming up with the "contraband" excuse for not returning slaves and for forcing New Orleans' women to stop dissing Union soldiers.) And throughout the entire war, the Union had the better generals in the non-combat tail, e.g Meigs.
As in any conflict, some officers were Peter Principled (Burnside, Warren), some rose far beyond expectations (Chamberlain), some showed potential but failed miserably when put to the test (Hooker, Baldy Smith), and some of the best and brightest on paper turned out to have no aptitude for the job in the field (McClellan, Halleck, Bragg for the South.)
And the big picture is that without the inadequacy of the Union Commanders in the East in the early years there would have been no Emancipation Proclamation. Had the Union not being doing so poorly in putting down the Slaveholders' Rebellion, Lincoln could been able to position the Emancipation Proclamation as a means of undercutting the enemy.
At the start of the war, Lee was clearly head and shoulders above the rest, and if he taken up Lincoln on his offer of command he probably would have whipped the secesh at Bull Run. But Lee didn't seem to grow much as a general during the war, almost to the end viewing his primary job to be the protection of Virgina. In particular, he never seemed to figure out that his famous audacity was counterproductive, given what Lincoln described as the terrible arithmetic. Although touted as another Washington, he failed to understand that Washington, a much poorer general in tactical terms, had the right strategy for defending a large territory against outsiders trying to force you into submission -- all you have to do is keep harassing the invaders until they get fed up and let you go.
Per John Keegan, and contrary to Shelby's Foote's glorification of Forrest, the one genius general of the Civil War was Grant. He started so far back in the pack the only way he could get any command at all was through his political connections in Illinois, but more than anyone else in the war he learned from his experiences. His Vicksburg campaign is the most brilliant of any American general ever -- MacArthur might have surpassed if he had kept his ego in check after Inchon. More important, though, Grant, unlike Lee but like Lincoln, came to see what had to be done to win the war, and he did it.
Finally, there's the horses for courses factor. Some generals excelled in some situations but in other situations were not as well suited as another general. Grant realized this when he let Sherman free to march into Georgia while Thomas stayed behind to hold down the gains in the West: Thomas had proved at Chickamauga that no rebel army was going to budge him, and Grant must have sensed that Sherman couldn't be stopped once he got going. Similarly, to Meade's amazement, Grant let Sheridan prove that he could, if released from the main force, track down J.E.B. Stuart and kill him.
Like someone above, I had a problem with the two of four African American soldiers on which Glory focused being escaped slaves. The 54th was essentially a regiment of Jackie Robinsons, recruited from as far away as Illinois, and intentionally comprised primarily, if not entirely, of men who'd always been free.
I also wish the filmmakers had mentioned the response of Robert Gould Shaw's family when the Confederates tried to insult Shaw by burying him in a common grave with African Americans.